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While books on various kinds of insider threats do exist, meticulously compiled information on the topic 
in the context of nuclear security is hard to come by. Information in the nuclear domain rarely comes to 
light for security reasons and makes this strain of insider threats a challenging topic to write about. This 
edited volume entitled Insider Threats, compiled by two of the most respected Professors in the field of 
nuclear security today, namely Matthew Bunn of Harvard University, and Scott D. Sagan of Stanford 
University, arrived on bookshelves as a timely publication. 
Insider threats can be defined as “a security threat that originates from within the organization being 
attacked or targeted, often an employee or officer of an organization or enterprise.” Further, in this book, 
Bunn and Sagan define an insider as “a person with authorized access to items that an organization wishes 
to protect – information, people, and dangerous or valuable materials, facilities, and equipment.” Insiders 
are then categorized into several distinct varieties according to either the role they play – passive (passing 
on sensitive information about security vulnerabilities to external agents), active (someone perhaps 
unlocking a door in the guarded facility for an outsider), or violent (attacking or killing a colleague in the 
facility to further their own agenda) – or according to how they morph into an insider threat – self-
motivated (having their own agenda), recruited (already in an organization but then motivated by external 
agents to be part of a plot), infiltrated (someone in an adversary group is able to join a high security 
organization as a kind of ‘sleeper’ individual who will strike at an opportune time), inadvertent (making 
errors without desiring to that leave an organization open to external threats), and coerced (loyal to 
organization but under duress from external agents who perhaps have threatened to kill their family, for 
instance.) 
Insider threats are not a frequent occurrence, but when an incident does occur, rare as they may be, they 
can be devastating. For instance, the book talks inter alia about a $200 million bill resulting from 
economic damage caused to the Doel-4 nuclear reactor in Belgium in 2014 wherein an insider, unknown 
to this day, was suspected to have sabotaged a single turbine. 
Beyond the chapters contributed by editors Bunn and Sagan, this book also brings together some of the 
brightest minds in the field in the Western Hemisphere as contributors, each considering insider threats 
from a specific angle. For instance, Thomas Hegghammer and Andreas Daehli’s piece does a deep dive 
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on not only on what Jihadists have done with respect to nuclear materials, but also their communications 
and plans concerning such materials and facilities. The next chapter by Amy Zegart focuses on Nidal 
Malik Hasan, the perpetrator of the notorious Fort Hood shootings. Zegart tries to discern why the United 
States Department of Defense as well as the United States Army failed to observe clear red flags in 
Hasan’s behavior for years until it was too late. In the third chapter, Jessica Stern and Ronald Schouten 
discuss the strange case of Bruce Ivins – a loner who used the cover of the 9/11 attacks to threaten high-
ranking US government officials with letters laced with spores of the deadly anthrax virus. This was also 
a case where obvious red flags about Ivins’ personality were overlooked when they should not have been. 
In his piece, Austin Long writes about Afghan troops killing their American trainers and why it 
skyrocketed in 2014, and thereby the lessons to be learnt from that scenario to apply in the context of 
nuclear security. The penultimate chapter derives examples of insider threats stemming from casinos and 
the pharmaceutical industry and once again their applicability to the nuclear industry. The authors do 
concede here that it is easier to perhaps learn lessons from casinos due to the field having far less to do 
with national security. Finally, in a concluding chapter, Bunn and Sagan do an encore with a worst-
practices guide to insider threats which sums up the material in the other chapters and draws ten 
generalizable lessons learned of how organizations should try and avoid falling prey to insider woes. 
Insider Threats discovers that cognitive, as well as organizational biases, can lead to insider issues. 
Nuclear insider threat related plans mentioned rarely to never in jihadist writings. The reader would 
possibly heave a sigh of relief based on that information, only to find out about a sabotage in a nuclear 
plant in the news the next day. Thus, it is precisely to overcome any possibility of complacency leading to 
such disasters and to ensure that organizations today do not repeat the same mistakes other organizations 
made in the past leading to insider problems that this book was written, as Bunn states in a lecture. Otto 
von Bismarck’s quote is appropriately utilized here, roughly translating from the original German as: 
Only fools learn from experience. I prefer to learn from others’ experiences and mistakes. 
Insider Threats is a very accessible book. The main text is less than 180 pages long and neatly divided 
into six enriching chapters. The language is lucid and engaging. Though the intended audience perhaps 
primarily remains scholars and practitioners of nuclear security, the use of simple language can make it 
equally interesting for the lay reader with either an interest in this topic or possessing a curious 
disposition. It is ideally a must-read for professionals working in the nuclear security industry to remain 
well-versed with the various red flags they may encounter at the workplace.  
This book also underscores the importance of preventing sensitive organizations from missing red flags 
about insiders and is a genuine embodiment of the maxim “it is better to be safe than sorry”. What it does 
less of is focus on the type of error that may occur when the organization perceives just about everyone 
working there as insiders, who do not exist, to the point of paranoid obsession. Overall, this book is useful 
for a certain audience – primarily those working in security-related organizations, especially of the 
nuclear variety. It is also useful for scholars in the nuclear security field to develop their knowledge on a 
pertinent issue, though not extremely common yet, to prevent the potential Chelsea Mannings and Aldrich 
Ames’ of their organization to successfully strike. 
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